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ON TH E MEANING OF KATEGORIA IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES1
John P. Anton
Department of Philosophy
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL 33620

I
In 1974,1 wrote a paper, subsequently published in 1975 in Diotima HI (1975), 67-81,
in which I argued that the Aristotelian texts, particularly that of the Categories, allow for a
parallel yet distinct interpretation to the traditional and prevalent one that takes the
categories to be terms, ultimate classes, types, concepts. My position there was that the
primary use of kategoria refers to well formed statements made according to canons, or if
one prefers, i.e. fundamental types of predication conforming to rules sustained by the ways
of beings. That article received no attention I know of except in a brief comment in footnote
in Guthrie’s A History of Greek Philosophy.2 I was pleased to note that M. Frede, in an
important article published in 1981, defended the same reading of the term kategoria mainly
by examining closely to textual evidence in the Topics. He also defended the thesis that the
text of the Categories does not contain the elements needed to construct an explicit theory
of categories.3 In revising my 1983 paper for publication I thought it useful to go beyond

1 This paper was presented at the December 28,1983 meeting of the Society for Ancient
Greek Philosophy, Boston, MA.
2 Vol. Six: Aristotle (Cambridge 1981), 138 n. 1: "What follows here does not do justice
to Anton’s ’Theory of Categories’ in the periodical Diotima for 1975."
3 M. Frede 1987, 29-30. The 1981 article, reprinted in this volume; all references to this
edition. Much to my regret, Professor Frede’s article became available to me after I
presented my paper in December 1983, and therefore had no opportunity to address this
issue at that time.
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the initial purpose to show why certain distinctions in the treatise Categories could have
prevented Aristotle’s interpreters from insisting on defending the established use o fkategoria
as oficial doctrine, and to restate my argument as it relates to the problematic of Professor
Frede’s denial of the presence of a theory of categories in the Categories.
In trying to decide how Aristotle uses the term κατηγορία in the treatise that bears
the same name, Categories.4 provision must be made for the fact that there is nothing in
the text to justify the meanings that ancient commentators, including recent writers, assigned
to it and found their way both in translations of Aristotle’s works and in the corpus of
established philosophical terminology.5 The present article is written with the hope that it
will contribute to understanding why certain distinctions in the treatise Categories should
have prevented interpreters from assigning the traditional meaning of ’genera of being’ to

4 The title of the treatise was a subject of considerable dispute in antiquity. For a recent
survey on this problem see M. Frede 1987 esp. Chapter 2, "The Title, Unity and
Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories." 11-28. According to Frede "the question of
authenticity is crucially linked to the question of unity" (12). The problem of the unity covers
the relation of the early part of the treatise to the part that discusses the post-predicamenta.
5 There are many surveys of interpretations concerning the categories. I do not plan to
offer another survey, for my main interest lies in the investigation into what we can learn
about the theory of categories in the Categories. Nor am I concerned with reproducing and
commenting on the table of enumeration of the "categories" in Aristotle’s works. The list can
be readily found in O. Apelt, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie (Leipzig
1891), conveniently reproduced in Leo Elders, Aristotle’s Theory of the One: A Commentary
on Book X fo the Metaphysics (Assen 1961), pp. 194-6. One can still raise the question
about the intent of the list or lists. If we can defend our objections to making the list on the
basis of the reading of the term ’categoría’ to refer to classes of being, then we have an
alternative before us, which has not been suitably explored to determine the extent to which
it is present, if at all, in the writings of commentators since antiquity: namely whether what
is listed is not classes of being but refers to the relevant types of statements that pertain to
the attribution of genuine features of the entity named in the subject position. It is the
existence of the concrete individual qua subject that sets the context for the selective lists
of relevant types of attribution.

,
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the term ’category’and hence giving it the meaning of highest predicate rather than
fundamental type of predication.
The word kategoria occurs only twice in the text, although the verb kategorein is used
more frequently. As for the traditional use of the term, one should not discard the possibility
that the assigning of such meanings as ’term’, ’type’, ’class’, ’predicate’, was affected by an
unconscious borrowing from "interpreted" readings of meanings into this term as it occurs
in other Aristotelian texts where kategoria occurs and then inserted into the understanding
of what the word meant in the brief treatise. But that is another issue and too complex to
be discussed without introducing contexts related to factors influencing interpretations. The
main topic before us is the relation and affinity between two terms, genus and category.
Generally speaking our problem is this: What precisely can be said about the meaning of the
term kategoria and what clues do we possess, assuming that Aristotle or whoever wrote the
treatise embedded certain ciphers in the text, that if detected may help us identify the
intended philosophical or technical use. Thus our question should be: How can we attribute
to Aristotle a theory of categories, presumably present in the treatise titled Categories when
we do not even know for certain whether a technical use was in fact intended to function
within a theory.6 If this treatise, especially part one (chapters 1-9), has a subject, let us say

6
It is a debatable point whether it is correct to speak of a fully formed and theoretically
developed "catégorial theory," in the modem sense of such a theory, embedded somehow
in Aristotle’s logical works. It certainly cannot be found in the manner in which Kant, for
instance, developed such a theory (Critique of Pure Reason. A81/B1071. It should be obvious
to the informed reader that Aristotle did not formulate such a theory. He never defines the
term "category," yet he uses it in ways that he must have believed that his students and
readers understood him. I am convinced that he used it in a technical sense, but not in the
sense that his Neoplatonist commentators, medieval and modem, attributed to him. If he has
a theory at all, it is part of his theory of language, of his philosophy of logos, of rational
discourse in its capacity to articulate the structures and processes of the world, including
those of the human world.
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to put forth "a theory of categories," how do we establish this conclusion, as Frede (1987,15)
correctly suggests? Admittedly, Aristotle has formulated a detectable doctrine, and while
it may be presemt in bare outline in the Categories, the fuller version can be reconstructed
all its part and its unity established only through the collection and collation of all the
pertinent passages in the extant works as a special chapter of what seems to be his general
theory of language as logical discourse.
II
The present paper, while basically a criticism of evidence, also advances the thesis I
discussed in my 1975 paper, in which I defended a propositional interpretation of the
Aristotelian categories.7 The thesis originally intended to correct as well as to complement
the traditional and firmly established interpretation of Aristotle’s use of kategoria. a view
that reaches back to the writings of the early commentators, probably with roots in
Aristotle’s contemporaries in the Academy. What generates the problem under discussion
is mainly the one-sidedness of the prevailing view that takes it for granted that the
expressions "genera of being" and "genera of category" (γένη του

ovtos,

γένη τής

κατηγορίας) can be conflated and hence used interchangeably without the slightest
alteration of meaning.8

7 For further remarks on this issue see my "Aristotle’s Theory of Categories in
Post-Classical Ontologies," in Proceedings of the World Congress on Aristotle. (Greece,
1981), 214-220; and in "Aspects of Ancient Ontologies," in Philosophies of Existence: Ancient
and Medieval, ed. P. Morewedge (Fordham, 1982), 60-77.
8 The expression τα γένη των κατηγοριών does not occur in the Categories: it is
found in Topics I. 9, 103b20, 29, 39; also in Soph. El. 178a5. In Top. I. 15, 107a2-3 the text
reads: τα γένη των κατά το δνομα κατηγοριών. Here the expression is used to identify
homonvma. on the condition that the same genus is not predicable of all things having the
same name.
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However, the range of the problem does not end here. It should be extended to cover
not only the problem of the aforementioned conflation but also the discrepancy between the
inordinate amount of literature on Aristotle’s so-called "doctrine of categories," claiming that
such a doctrine is to be found in the brief treatise Categories, on the one hand, and the
peculiar absence of a definition of the concept, on the other. To this curious omission we
may add the conspicuous absence of a lexical passage to cover the uses of kategoria in the
list of principles in Metaphysics. Bk. V.9
This being the case, it seems only appropriate to raise the issue of evidence, since the
term kategoria is left undefined in these two key treatises,10 a close examination of the
passages where the words kategorein. kategoroumenon. and kategoria occur in the
Categories, must be undertaken in order to assess the merits or demerits of the traditional
reading of these terms. It may be difficult but not impossible to identify the functions of the
concept of kategoria in Aristotle’s logical, ontological and other doctrines. His ancient and
later commentators, down to the present, have justifiably devoted lengthy studies to this
aspect of his philosophy. In light of the scholarship in this area, it should be pointed out that
the history of proposed interpretations exhibits variations of the same fundamental approach,
one that is dominated by the quest for ultimate simples, be they genera of beings, of classes,
of concepts, or of signifiers. Perhaps the sole exception is a thesis Christian Brandis

9 M eta. V, devotes separate chapters to the following fundamental concepts, traditionally
called "categories"; ov: 7, 1017α7-69; οΐισία: 8,1017610-25; ττοσόν: 13, 1020α7-32; -ποιόν: 14,
1020α33-625; Tipos τι: 16 1020626-1021611; πάθο$: 21,1022615-21; βχειν: 2 3 ,1023α8-25.
10 A stipulative definition is also absent in the De Interpretatione. a work in which this
term occurs only once. This is rather strange, especially in view of the fact that Aristotle
assigns technical meanings to ’name’ or ’noun’, and ’verb’, ’affirmation’, ’negation’,
’proposition’ or ’statement’, and ’sentence’ (logos).
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proposed a century ago that the Aristotelian categories are "the most general forms or
species of propositions which are removed and dissociated from sentential contexts."11
Evidently it found no supporters, and the traditional interpretation continued to prevail
intact. One of the curious features its defenders share is the absence of any discussion on
the question why kategoria is not defined in the logical treatises or in the Metaphysics.
despite the fact that each and every commentator and interpreter accept as given Aristotle’s
"doctrine of categories," a kategorienlehre. Perhaps we will never find a satisfactory answer
to that question, but we must not therefore take the view that a problem does not exist.
Briefly stated, it pertains to the range of functions of the theory, namely coverage of the
genera of being, including highest classes of predicates. If so, the problem of range raises
the question whether it is proper at all to extend the range to include a theory of ultimate
types of propositions as a basic component of the doctrine.12 Evidently, the question of

11 Cited in F. Brentano, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, edited and
translated by R. George (Berkeley, 1975), p. 177, n. 141. Brandis gives three passages in
support of this view, Top. 1.9, 103b20, Meta. VI. 2, 1926a26, and XIV. 2, 1089a26. See
Brandis, Griechisch-roemische Philosophie II, 2, 1, p. 394; also Geschichte der Entwinklungen der griechischen Philosophie und ihrer Nachwirkungen in Roemlischen Reiche (Berlin,
1862), I. Hälfte, pp. 430-1.
12 The prevailing view on the subject in the long history of philosophy has not changed
much since the time of the early commentators. For instance, Iamblichus, summarizing the
venerable tradition of the Neoplatonists, declares that the categories are "expressions
signifying things by means of concepts." Simplicius, ACG. VIII, 2.30-3.17, where he lists the
names of the interpreters who in his opinion came closest to Aristotle: Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Alexander of Aegae, Porphyry (who borrowed from the views of Theophrastus
and Boethus), Herminus, Iamblichus, and Syrianus; also at 67.26ff he gives his and
Iamblichus’ views on what the division into ten genera means and what it contains. Kant’s
views are too well known to call for comment. In more recent times Bonitz declared the
categories "the highest genera of being," while W. D. Ross (1924, Ixxxii-lxxxiii, and lxxxiii note
2) called them "the predicates par excellence." On the whole, the views on the subject have
varied but slightly, all of them favoring the thesis that the categories stand for ultimate
simple predicates or concepts, either in the sense of the highest genera of things or the
highest concepts of the mind.
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range did not find any serious supporters. It was ignored as impertinent.
The history of the commentaries on the doctrine of categories reveals a continuum,
of the same fundamental approach, dominated by the quest for ultimate simples. In order
to secure the pursuit, interpreters resorted to the conflation of Aristotle’s distinction between
"genera of being" and "genera of category or categories."

A tradition was established

whereby interpreters invariably chose to identify the categories (a) logically with the κατά
μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν λεγάμενα (things not said in combination), and (b) ontologically
with the γένη του

ovtos

(genera of being). The underlying assumption in either case is that

the two lists of genera can be conflated conceptually and used interchangeably without
serious alternation to the basic meaning of kategoria.
We must therefore re-examine the text of the Categories in order to ascertain the
correctness of the view that restricts the meaning of the term kategoria to ultimate types of
predicates and simple signifiers. The analysis that follows questons whethr the prevalent
traditional approach to the meaning of kategoria has the textual evidence needed to render
its claims definitive. Positively stated, the proposal to extent the meaning of this celebrated
term to include the propositional thesis can be supported through a different reading of the
related passages. Although Aristotle explicitly refers to ultimate units of signification, the
term kategoria as used inthe text does not preclude a reading according to which it stands
for propositions as the fundamental carriers of completed attributions whose function is to
capture in logos the truth of beings.
The position is essentially the same I essayed to argue in my several publications on
the subject, but now with slight modifications. The main idea in those papers was to show
that instead of assuming that simple conceptual units, however identified, constitute the sole
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basis for determining the meaning of the categories, we should also consider as suitable
candidates the complex units of judgment (κρίσις), which as assertions are cases of
"expressions said in combination" (κατά συμπλοκήν λεγάμενα). As such they convey the
perceived factual connections of things (δντα). Each confirmed attribution correctly noticed
and reported, is an assertion (κατάφασή).
Since first ousia is the ultimate and first subject, the ontic hvpokeimenon. and is
naturally a composite unity, to say what ousia is, by capturing its complexity in the activity
of speech, legein. requires the employment of composite logical unities: attributive
statements as signifiers of articulated judgments. There is good reason why the making of
attributive statements should be brought under the umbrella of the extended meaning of the
kategoria. a word that originally meant "accusation." This abstract noun and the related
words that Aristotle added to his terminology derive from the key verb κατηγορείν.
I should like to point out the dangers thatl attend the conflating of basic expressions.
Carried out in the case of the terms predication and predicate (κατηγορία and
κατηγορούμενον), this operation has the advantage of preserving the meaning of categories
as simple and ultimate types of predicative units. However, by so doing it can also cause
confusion and inadvertent interpretive errors. Therefore, it is of the essence that these two
terms be kept apart and be discussed separately when obscurities in the text explicitly
demand the preserving of distnctions. Comparably we must also exhibit the coordinate
function of basic terms without using alien notions of conceptual subordination of terms as
in the diverse schemes of catégorial deduction. It cannot be denied that our translations
from the Greek are replete with instances of conflations and/or unexplained substitutions
due to the interchangeable employment of the expressions ’predicate’ and ’predication’ for
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κατηγορούμενον and κατηγορία.13
A kategoria^ in its functional aspect, stands for the articulated outcome of what
speakers do when completing an accusation and, by extension, an attribution. To do what
kategorein calls for is to effect by means of verbal signs an attributive statement in order to
exhibit a determinate connection between a subject and what belongs to it either essentially
or as co-incidental properties, i.e. what the subject is and has. Given this fuller context, then,
"category" is by way of function and structure a complex utterance, what Aristotle calls a
case of κατά συμπλοκήν λεγόμενον; it employs a subject word and a predicate word, a
noun and a verb or signifíers connected with the copula. One of the key passages that
support this position occurs in Posterior Analytics I. 22, 82b37-84a2, and is reinforced by
what is said in Prior Analytics I. 46, 52al5, where kategoria is unambiguously equated to
kataphasis. affirmation.

Caution must be advised at this point, because one must not

conclude from uses of kategoria discernable in the Analytics that the$^ are also present in
the treatise Categories. More work needs to be done to show that such is the case. In
general, nothing of real value to our understanding of Aristotle is gained by taking the term
kategoria to stand for the genera of beings and hence using it to cover the case of highest
predicates. What I think is needed is the restoration of the embedded distinction Aristotle
introduced between predicate and predication and by so doing preserve the difference

13
Consider the difficulty a translator must face when asked to revert to the original
language and identify equivalent terms for the ones he has selected from his own language
to render texts. In English, the expressions used to translate the catégorial passages in
Aristotle are "to predicate," "predicable," and "predication." Now, if kategoria. in its technical
sense, can only mean "predicate," the translator would be at a loss to come up with a
separate term to cover the case of predication as the equivalent of "proposition." By avoiding
the conflation, this puzzling problem disappears. I bring up this issue mainly because it shows
how interpretations seriously affect the manner of translating complex texts as well as issues
of substance.
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between genera of being and categories. Thus the ontic reference of the former must be
keep separate from the expressions to which Aristotle refers when he talks about "what is
said in combination" (κατά σνμπλοκήν λεγάμενα), i.e. canonical assertions in accordance
with the rules that govern the syntax of attributions to reflect the complex properties of
unified ousiai. their essential and their accidental properties. By observing the distinction,
we use language as (a) naming and (b) stating. Truth belongs to the logical-linguistic function
of articulating the experience of reality. The categories supply the ultimate forms for
announcing and communicating the content of true statements.

Ill
In the Categories we encounter two expressions, both related to the same root and
differing only in the prefix: ττροσηγορία and κατηγορία. The former is hardly ever discussed
as an ingredient of Aristotle’s theory of categories, yet there is no doubt that it is part of the
broader terminological apparatus to be taken into account when an attempt is made to
reconstruct the theory. Prosegoria occurs only twice in the Categories, in la l3 and 3al4, as
part of the following expressions: κατά τουνομα ττροσηγορία and σχήμ α τής ττροσηγορίas·14 We should also note that the second occurrence is found only after the only two
occurrences of κατηγορία in Chapter 5 ,3a35 and 37. The verb κατηγορεΐν and the passive
form κατηγορεΐσθαι, as well as the passive present participle κατηγορούμενον, occur
earlier in the treatise, beginning with chapter 3, lb 10.
Yet the verb ττροσηγορείν is not to be found anywhere either in the Categories or
in the De Interpretatione. The closest expression is -προσαγορεύεται, as in la9, in

14
Liddell-Scott Greek Dictionary gives several meaning of ττροσηγορία, and lists
Aristotle’s use in Cat. Ial3 to mean "addressing" and in 3bl4 to mean "appellation," "name."

J.P. Anton. Aristotle’s Categories Revisited

11

connection with svnonvma. to explain what the latter are: otov ζφον οτε άνθρωπος καί ó
βοής* τούτων γάρ έκάτερον κοινφ όνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζφον.
A comparison of uses, as these passages indicate, shows that προσηγορία is limited
to "naming" and "appellation"; the related verb meaning "to call by name." This connection
to the word ’name’, δνομα, helps us better to understand the technical term kategoria. and
also whether the mode or scheme, σχήμα, of naming is transferrable to the expression
"mode of predication," σχήμα τής κατηγορίας.
The first occurrence of the verb kategorein makes it clear that what is meant is a
determinate connection between two signified things, between two instances of onta. which
have presumably been given names. We are now beyond the level of prosegoria. One would
expect, therefore, that since kategoria signifies the result of articulating a judgment by
combining signifiers to form a comeplete statement, we should expect the disclosure to have
articulated a determinate connection between two named things, and more precisely, not an
unfinished announcement like ’the rose and the lady’ or ’Jane and June’, but an instance of
genuine attribution. Chapter 2 makes clear what the term hvpokeimenon means in two
special contexts: (1) to be in a subject and (b) to be said of a subject. The fourfold
combination given there yields the parameters needed for the formulation of canons.
As Aristotle proceeds with chapter 3, the ground has been carefully prepared to
introduce the verb kategorein in the technical sense. The more general expression legetai
is left behind.15 What is said of a subject will now be called kategoroumenon. The previous
chapter has already made clear what it is to be a subject: it is an existent, a being, ov, and

15
W.K.C. Gurthrie (1981,142 n.4) differs on this point, as he remarks in a note meant
to correct what I intimated in the 1975 article. Guthrie’s insistence that kategoreisthai and
legetai are used indifferently is not convincing, as we shall see.
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also the recipient of a prosegoria. a name. The name of the existent is a signifier, a
legomenon "not said in combination" (λεγόμενον μη κατά συμπλοκήν), but qua öv it
underlies all other types of inhering existents yet only if it is also a first ousia. Being a first
ousia it cannot be in another subject, nor can it be said of another subject. We now know
what an on must have in order to qualify as hvpokeimenon par excellence.
Chapter 3 opens with a statement where the verb kategorein occurs for the first time,
and presupposes (i) the aforesaid clarification of the fundamental meaning of hvpokeimenon.
and (ii) the canonical ways of stating the interconnections of onta. With kategorein we move
from the names of things to the complex act of attribution, by means of which predicates are
connected to subjects. Given the fundamental position of the subject, "whatever is said of
a predicated thing will also be said of the subject," the pattern of controlled predication of
named things, i.e. concrete subjects, and species and genera, including the differentiating
properties, is next carefully delineated. We thus have become cognizant of the first and
crucial type of combined expressions, κατά συμπλοκήν λεγάμενα. The text offers
incontrovertible evidence that the verb kategorein is used to cover canonically controlled
combined expressions in the making of attributions. The concepts involved in the
performance of kategorein are also the ones employed in the classification of individuals and
the formation of essential definitions: concrete individuals as ultimate subjects, species,
genera and differentiae.
The next question is straightforward enough. What are the diverse genera of beings?
There are certain things, and we have names for them, which are said of a subject and exist
in said subject. This being the case, to give an account of such instances is to articulate an
existential connection in accordance with the canons of predication. When Aristotle proceeds
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to present his celebrated inventoiy of types or genera of beings, he gives us a list of the most
comprehensive denotative signifiers; each is a case of κατά μηδεμίαν συμπλοκήν
λεγόμενον. Each has its place as an element in the act of kategorein. Together these
elements comprise what has been traditionally and, in my opinion, mistakenly labelled "the
Aristotelian categories." Yet, the term kategoria is nowhere to be found in chapter 4.
Instead, all we have is a carefully drawn and rather uncomplicated set of expressions to
cover the following fundamentals: (1) things exist; (2) the ultimate existents are those in
which instances of the other genera of beings inhere, a fact that explains why the former
function as the ultimate subjects of canonical predications; (3) shared names of things, i.e.
genuine signifiers naming things that came under any one (excluding first ousia) of the ten
genera of being; (4) how simple signifiers understood as uncombined expressions function
denotatively; (5) why, when taken alone, none of these uncombined expressions constitutes
to function as an affirmation ikataphasis): (6) that affirmations are made by canonically
combined simple signifiers;16 and (7) only canonical affirmations can be said to be either
true or false, whereas none of the uncombined signifiers, their denotative power notwith
standing, are either true or false.
The remaining chapters are given to (a) an analysis of the range of denotation of
each type of simple signifiers and with many surprising results, not least of which is the
recognition that with the exception of ousia all the other general signifiers of types of being
are cases of homonymy; and (b) to the itemization of the sub-classes of signified being that

16
Subsequent to this, Aristotle states in chapter 10, 12b9-10 that των Otto την
κατάφασιν κ α ί την άττόφασιν ούδέν εστι λόγος: the component elements of affirmations
and negations, being uncombined signifiers are not statements, and hence are neither true
nor false.
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determine the mode of predication which is appropriate to each, as the names of denoted
entities are assigned their place in well-formed statements with referential claims.
Now we may turn our attention to chapter 4. There is no technical term in this brief
chapter to justify the traditional view adopted by the earlier commentators and continued
ever since, that identifies the ten categories with the ten most general types of signifíers or
ten uncombined signifying expressions: ousia. quantity, quality, relative, where, when,
being-in-a-position, having, doing, undergoing.
Neither the verb kategorein nor the noun kategoria occurs in this chapter. The
expression that provides a clue to the problem on hand, is kataphasis. However, the rule of
forming affirmations, of stringing signifíers to produce referential combinations with truth
claims, is not disclosed either. The four examples of uncombined expressions that Aristotle
gives at the end of the chapter, i.e. (a) ’human being’ (b) ’white’, (c) ’runs’ (d) ’wins’, if
randomly combined, do not necessarily produce affirmations. Certain combinations must
obviously be ruled out at the outset, e.g. ’white wins’, ’runs wins’, ’runs white’, ’wins man’,
etc. Acceptable candidates are ’man wins’, ’man runs’, and cases where a copula is supplied,
’man...white’. The point is anything but trivial, as the next chapter makes clear.
Chapter 5 deals with ousia on two levels: ontologically, it is recognized that ousia is
the most fundamental signifier, and logically, it hold the key that discloses the conditions for
canonical combinations of signifíers of beings. After introducing the distinction between the
primary and secondary meanings of ousia. Aristotle suddenly changes his ’saying’ verbs, and
shifts from legetai to the more technical verb kategorein-kategoreisthai. "to predicate" i.e.
to attribute what one signifier denotes to what another signifier names according to the
ontological order of essence and inherence of things. The ontic settings of things determine
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the correct modes for effecting proper combinations of signifiers. The verb kategorein as
used, legislates requisite restrictions for the weaving of signifiers in reporting the objective
complexity of being as first ousia. and as species and differentia and as genus. Since no first
ousia can be predicated of another first ousia. the remaining substantive signifiers fall into
place.
The only two occurrences of the word kategoria in this chapter are related to the
formulation of the two rules that govern substantive predication, one positive and one
prohibitive.17 (a) Positive. In all canonical predications involving secondary ousiai and
differentiae, the assertions are about either individuals or species (3a34-5). Thus the rule
is that in substantive statements of attribution the subject position is occupied either by a
first ousia signifier or a species signifier, (b) Prohibitive. No predication using first ousiai as
attributive signifiers is legitimate or even comprehensible. The rule is that no first ousia
functions as kategoroumenon in a well-formed predication.
Before proceeding with the discussion of kategorein and kategoreisthai. and the third
occurrence of kategoria. it is important to note that neither the verb nor the noun is
employed in the special analysis of the range of denotation of each general type of signifiers,

17

The positive in Cat. 5, 3a33-37: ' Τ π ^ χ ε ι δε T ats o u a ta is κ α ί T ats διαφοραΐ$ τα
πά ντα συνώ νυμος ά π ’ αυτών λέγεσθαι* πά σ α ι yàp a l άπο τούτων κατηγορίαι ήτοι
κατά των ατόμων κατηγορουνται η κατά των είδών. άπο μεν γάρ τή$ ιτρώτη$
o u a ta s ουδεμία εσ τί κατηγορία,- κατ’ oùôevos yàp υποκείμενου λέγεται-. The
prohibitive passage is in 8, 10b 12-25:'Τπ^ρχει δε κ α ι εναντιόττβ κατά το ποιόν, οιον
δικαιοσύνη άδικίςτ εναντίον κ α ί λευκότη5 μελανία κ α ί τάλλα ώσαυτα^, κ α ί τα κατ’
auTàs δε ποια λεγόμενα-ετι εάν των εναντίων θάτερον ή ποιόν, κ α ί τό λοιπόν εσται
ποιόν, τούτο δε δήλον προχειριζομενφ Tas áXXas κατηγορίας, οιον εΐ εσ τι ή
δικαιοσύνη τη αδικία εναντίον, ποιον δε ή δικαιοσύνη, ποιόν άρα κ α ί ή αδικία'
ουδεμία γάρ των άλλων κατηγοριών εφαρμόζει τη άδικί^, ποσόν ούτε πρός τι ούτε
που, ουδ’ ολως τι τών τοιουτων ουδεν άλλ’ η ποιόν* ωσαύτως δε κ α ί έ π ι τών άλλων
κατά τό ποιόν εναντίων.
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i.e. what the traditional view calls "categories". The verb Aristotle uses almost invariably in
this long portion of the treatise is legetai. Each genus comes in for an analysis, though not
exhaustive, and enumeration of the subordinate sub-classes of signifiers of things that are
collected together under the umbrella of an inclusive and ultimate class. Whether this is an
analysis of "categories," an unpackaging of inclusive types of names, is highly debatable, to
say the least. Whatever it is that Aristotle is doing there leaves little room for speculation.
What needs to be re-iterated is that nowhere in these "analyses" of ultimate classes of
signifiers does he use the term kateeoria to refer to the classifiable things these denote.
IV
All commentators who have suppressed the terminological difference between
predicate and predication (κατηγορούμενον and κατηγορία) conclude that kateeoria means
"predicate," thus lending their authority to a misreading of the passages in which Aristotle
uses the word κατηγορία to mean "attributive proposition." The position I have taken in this
paper is presented as an argument to support a different reading and with the hope that the
established interpretation can be challenged through a fresh examination of the textual
testimonies to accommodate the suppressed part of Aristotle’s theory of categories as
ultimate types of canonical propositions. The thesis I have sought to advance is, in technical
language, that the categories stand for fundamental types of attribution that conform to rules
formulated in accordance with the ontology of first substance (ττρώτη ουσία).
In order to make the argument stand I thought it necessary to propose that this
reading, since it draws attention to the logical syntax of predicative statements, requires in
the context of the treatise Categories a shifting of emphasis from simple expressions or what
Alexander of Aphrodisias called "the most general parts of logos whose purpose is to signify
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simple things and simple concepts about simple things,"18 to things said in combination par
excellence." The objective now becomes one of showing how the fundamental modes of
predication (τά σχήμ ατα τής κατηγορίας), and in accordance with the ten genera of
being, can be determined through a careful scrutiny of canonical attributive statements. In
these statements it is always the case that the signifying exemplars in each distinct genus of
being are introduced and assigned to occupy the subject and predicate positions by
conforming to the logic of rules.
The critical review of evidence must begin reasonably enough with the brief treatise
Categories. Most authorities agree that this treatise contains a number of fundamentals to
be found in Aristotle’s theory on the subject. Yet the claim seems somewhat paradoxical
when we stop to think that nowhere in this treatise does Aristotle elaborate on the use of
this term. To this peculiarity we must add the conspicuous absence of a special chapter in
Metaphysics V to explain the concept of "category" as a principle, although there are
separate chapters on such genera of being as

ousia. quantity, quality etc., that is the

traditional "categories."
We find in the Categories two closely resembling expressions that differ only in the
prefix: ττροσηγορία and κατηγορία. The former is never discussed as an ingredient in
interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of categories. The term occurs only twice in this treatise,
in lal3 and 3al4: (i) κατά τουνομα ττροσηγορία and (it) σχήμ α τής τφοσηγορίας,
meaning ’addressing’ and ’appellation’ or ’name’. Its relevant role in the theory of naming
should be obvious. As for the term kategoria. much to our surprise, it occurs only in two

18 Ammonius, In Categorías proemium. CAG. IV, 13. Philoponus quotes Ammonius and
concurs with Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to Simplicius, CAG. VIII, 10, 10-19; also
Brandis, ed. Scholia in Aristotelem. (Berlin, 1836), 31a6.
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passages, in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 8, twice in each chapter, for a total of four
occurrences, and all come after the presentation of the listing of "uncombined expressions,"
i.e. the ones that comprise the celebrated list of traditional "categories."19
Of greater weight is the frequent occurrence of the verb κατηγορείν-κατηγορείσθαι
and the passive present participle κατηγορούμενον. The first occurrence of κατηγορείν in
chapter 3 lb 10 makes clear that it signifies the activity of connecting two signified things in
the manner of attribution. The logical and ontological grounds have already been made clear
in what is said in chapter 2 with reference to what it means to be "in a subject" and to be
"said of a subject." The fourfold combination they produce yields the parameters for the
formulation of the canons of correct attribution which in turn determine the type of
predication (κατηγορία) under which any well formed affirmation (κατάφασι$) falls. The
technical sense of κατηγορείν is undeniably present; by implication as well as use, the same
holds for κατηγορία. Neither of the two, nor the term κατηγορούμενον is employed in the
analyses of the genera that follow the discussion on ousia. Instead, we see a systematic use
of the verb λέγεται for the unraveling of their uses and notations. Kategoria makes its last
brief appearance in Chapter 8, where it can mean either "predicate" or "predication," both
being suitable readings. In view of these facts, we cannot help but wonder how so many
interpreters came to accept the Categories as the unquestioned source of a non-Aristotelian
doctrine of categories.

19 M. Frede (1987,16) claims that κατηγορία occurs only once in this treatise: 10bl9-20,
but corrects this to say (31) that it occurs twice in a passage "in two lines" (10bl9; 10b21).
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